2015. Mis-coordination and political misalignments in ticket-splitting: the case of Chile, 2005–2009

Patricio Navia y José Saldaña

Abstract

Voters normally split their tickets when they do not feel sufficiently represented by only one political party or when politicians cultivate a personal vote regardless of party identification. Yet, voters might also split their tickets when they feel indifferent about like-minded parties or individual candidates. The authors distinguish between misalignment ticket-splitting (MATS), caused by a mismatch between voters’ preferences and the alternatives offered by the party system, and mis-coordination ticket-splitting (MCTS), when like-minded parties offer choices equally acceptable to voters. MCTS is likely to occur under proportional representation systems with multiple parties. The authors apply our categorization to concurrent presidential and legislative elections in Chile in 2005 and 2009. There was plenty of MCTS but little MATS. The authors suggest that the two forms should be separately analyzed as they are reflective of different political phenomena.

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